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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: : Supreme Court No. 900479 
ESTATE OF ANDERSON : Priority 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant/Petitioner, Charter Thrift & Loan (hereinafter 
"Charter"), by and through its counsel of record, hereby submits 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. This appeal is taken pursuant to the of Rules 3 and 4, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Title 78-2-2, 
Paragraph (3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
2. This appeal is from an Order denying the Petition for 
Allowance of Claims filed by the Appellant/Petitioner, Charter 
Thrift & Loan, against the Appellee/Respondent, Estate of Glenn 
Claughton Anderson, Jr. 
1 
STATEMENT OF I88UE8 PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was Charter Thrift & Loan, as a known creditor of an 
estate entitled to notice of the commencement of the three (3) 
month nonclaim period, after which claims are barred by the Utah 
Nonclaim Statute? 
2. Is application of the Utah Nonclaim Statute to bar 
Charter Thrift & Loan's claim, absent actual notice of the running 
of the nonclaim period, a denial of due process under the United 
States Constitution, Amendment XIV, and Utah Constitution, Article 
1, §7, and therefore unconstitutional pursuant to the ruling of 
Tulsa Professional Collection Services vs. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1540 
(1988)? 
The issues as presented are questions of law and are therefore 
subject to review for correctness, without deference to the Trial 
Court's legal conclusions. Barber vs. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P. 2d 
248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ; Daniels vs. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass±n, 771 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Subsection 75-3-801 (1953), Utah Code Annotated: 
Notice to Creditors. Unless notice has already been 
given under this section, a personal representative upon 
his appointment shall publish a notice once a week for 
three successive weeks in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county announcing his appointment and 
address and notifying creditors of the estate to present 
their claims within three months after the date of the 
first publication of the notice or be forever barred. 
2 
Subsection 75-3-801 (1989), Utah Code Annotated: 
Notice to Creditors. Unless notice has already been 
given under this section, a personal representative upon 
his appointment shall publish a notice once a week for 
three successive weeks in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county announcing the personal 
representative's appointment and address and notifying 
creditors of the estate to present their claims within 
three months after the date of the first publication of 
the notice, or be forever barred. The personal 
representative shall, after making reasonable efforts to 
ascertain creditors of the estate, also mail such notice 
on or before fourteen days after the date of first 
publication to all then known creditors of the estate. 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV §1: 
[Citizenship-Due Process of Law-Equal Protection]. All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Const. Art. I, §7: 
[Due Process of Law]. No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
On or about March 1, 1990, Charter filed its original claim 
against the estate of Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr., (hereinafter 
The "Estate"). (P.2, f1). On or about April 19, 1990, Charter's 
]A11 references to the record are to page and paragraph 
numbers of the Rule 11(f) Stipulated Statement of the Case. 
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Claim was disallowed by the Estate. (P. 2, 112). On June 15, 1990, 
Charter petitioned the District Court for allowance of its claim. 
(P.2, 13). 
Memoranda were submitted to the District Court. (P.2, f4, 5, 
6 and 7) . On or about July 25, 1990, oral argument was heard by 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson of the Third District Court. 
(P.2, f8) . On or about September 4, 1990, Judge Wilkinson entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order Denying Charter's 
Petition. (P.2, f 9) . (A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order are attached hereto in the Appendix as Exhibit 
f,A,f) . Charter appeals the denial of its Petition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr., (hereinafter "Decedent"), 
passed away on July 19, 1987, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
(P.3, fl). 
2. On or about August 12, 1987, probate proceedings were 
commenced in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
for the probate of Decedent's will. (P.3, f2) . 
3. Shelly J. Jones, daughter of the Decedent, was appointed 
Personal Representative of the estate. (P.3, J[3) . 
4. Commencing on or about September 4, 1987, the Personal 
Representative caused a Notice to Creditors to be published for 
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three (3) consecutive weeks, in accordance with Utah Code 
Annotated, §75-3-801 (1953) (P.3, 54). 
5. The Personal Representative had knowledge that Charter 
Thrift & Loan was a creditor of the estate. (P.3, f5). 
6. The Personal Representative personally contacted Charter 
Thrift & Loan by telephone and informed it of her father's death, 
and that a probate had been filed, and that she had been appointed 
Personal Representative of her father's estate. (P.3, 116). 
7. Appellant Charter Thrift & Loan did not have actual 
notice of the publication of the Notice to Creditors. (P.3, 57). 
8. Charter Thrift & Loan was not given actual notice of the 
running of the claim bar period. (P.4, 58). 
9. Charter Thrift & Loan did not file a Creditor's Claim 
within the three (3) months of publication as required by Utah Code 
Annotated, §75-3-801 (1953), and did not file a creditor's claim 
until March 1, 1990. (P.4, f 9) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Charter was known by the Personal Representative as a 
creditor of the estate of Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr. (P.3, f5). 
Charter had actual knowledge of Mr. Anderson's death and notice 
that a personal representative had been appointed. (P.3, f6) . 
However, Charter was never given notice by mail or any other means 
as to impart actual notice to formally present its claims or be 
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barred. (P.3 and 4, f7 and 8). Such notice is now required to be 
given to known creditors under the standards set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated, §75-3-801 (1989). The only notice to present claims was 
published notice, as required by the aforementioned statute, as it 
read in 1987 when notice was published. That notice never came to 
the attention of the petitioner, Charter Thrift & Loan. (P.3, fl4). 
The issue of the constitutionality of barring claims solely on 
the basis of published notice has recently been ruled upon by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court ruled, in 
Tulsa Professional Collection Services vs. Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340 
(1988), that published notice was insufficient, under due process 
standards, to trigger the time bar of the typical nonclaim statute 
to known creditors. The United State Supreme Court ruled that 
reasonably ascertainable creditors were entitled to notice by mail 
or other means equally certain to impart actual notice that claims 
were due and would be barred if not presented in a timely manner. 
After this decision, the Utah Legislature amended the Utah nonclaim 
statute to include such a requirement. 
In this matter, since the Personal Representative did not 
attempt to notify Charter of the running of the claim bar period, 
and since Charter did not have actual notice of the running of the 
claim bar period; it was a denial of due process for the Trial 
Court to deny Charter's Petition to Allow its Claim against the 
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estate based upon application of the time bar which was activated 
solely by the published notice. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Deceased, Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr., passed away on 
July 19, 1987 (P.3, 51). Thereafter, Shelly Jones was appointed 
Personal Representative of the Deceased's estate and a probate was 
commenced (P.3, f3 and 6). Charter became aware of the death and 
that a Personal Representative had been appointed. The Personal 
Representative had knowledge that the Petitioner was a creditor of 
the estate (P. 3, J[5 and 6). On September 4, 1987, the Personal 
Representative began publication of notice to creditors to file 
claims, which publication continued through September 18, 1987 (P. 3 
1(4) . The published notice was given pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, §75-3-801, as it existed at that time. That statute 
read as follows: 
Unless notice has already been given under this Section, 
a personal representative upon his appointment shall 
publish a notice once a week for three successive weeks 
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county 
announcing his appointment and address and notifying 
creditors of the estate to present their claims within 
three months after the date of the first publication of 
notice or be forever barred. (Emphasis added). 
Charter was not given actual notice of the running of the 
claim bar (P.4, f8), nor did Charter have actual knowledge of the 
published notice (P.3 and 4, |7). Charter filed a claim, but it 
was not filed within three (3) months of publication (P.4, f9). 
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Petitioner's late filed claim was denied by the Personal 
Representative, whereupon Charter Thrift & Loan petitioned the 
District Court for allowance of its claim pursuant to §75-3-806, 
Utah Code Annotated, The District Court, the Honorable Judge 
Wilkinson presiding, entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and based thereupon denied Petitionees claim in reliance on 
the following conclusion of law: 
The constitutional due process rights of the creditor, 
Charter Thrift & Loan, were not violated because said 
creditor had received actual notice of the Decedent's 
death, the filing of the probate, and the appointment of 
Shelly J. Jones as Personal Representative. 
(See, Addendum Exhibit "A" at f3) . 
As set forth below, this conclusion of law is erroneous 
because knowledge or notice of death, appointment of a personal 
representative or commencement of a probate is not the equivalent 
of actual notice of the commencement of the three (3) month claim 
period. Further, the published notice of the claim period is 
constitutionally insufficient to trigger the three (3) month time 
bar of the nonclaim statute to bar claims of known creditors which 
have not received actual notice of the running of the claim bar 
period. Therefore, the District Court erred in denying Charter's 
Petition to Allow its Claim against the estate. This error denied 
Charter its constitutional rights of due process, and should be 
reversed with directions to allow Charter's claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. A CREDITOR IS ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS BEFORE ITS CLAIM 
MAY BE BARRED IN A PROBATE PROCEEDING 
A. The Requirement to Satisfy Constitutional Guaranties 
of Due Process Applies in Probate Proceedings 
Due to State Action 
The application of the guaranties of due process under the 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, and Utah Constitution, 
Article 1, Section 7, are based upon the fact that a probate action 
necessarily involves the State through its judicial branch. Since 
the Personal Representative acts based upon its appointment under 
an Order of Court, all actions of the Personal Representative 
regarding claims are subject to Court review. The finding that a 
probate proceeding involves State action was made by the United 
States Supreme Court in the case of Tulsa Professional Collection 
Services vs. Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988). In determining that the 
requirements of due process were involved in the barring of claims 
in a probate proceeding, the Supreme Court considered numerous 
factors which are set forth below. 
1. Probate proceedings, triggering the nonclaim statute, can 
only be commenced by petitioning the Court; 
2. The Court is required to set a hearing date on the 
petition; 
3. Notice is required to be sent to all heirs, 
legatees and devisees; 
4. The Court will admit the will to probate on the 
testimony of one subscribing witness; 
5. After being admitted to probate, the Court will 
appoint an executor and issue letters testamentary; 
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6. Immediately after appointment, the executor or 
executrix is required to give notice to the 
creditors of the deceased; and 
7. Proof of compliance with such requirement must be 
filed with the Court. 
Id. at 134L. 
Each of the steps set forth above are required by the Utah 
Probate Code and were taken by the Personal Representative in the 
present action. It was based upon these factors that the United 
States Supreme Court in Pope determined that the guaranty of due 
process was applicable in the application of the claim bar period 
under the Probate Code. The Supreme Court stated, "The probate 
court is intimately involved throughout, and without that 
involvement, the time bar is never activated". Id. at 1345. 
Further, the Supreme Court noted that the Oklahoma nonclaim 
statute "directs the executor or executrix to publish notice 
'immediately' after appointment". Id. at 1346. Therefore, "due 
process is directly implicated and actual notice generally is 
required." id. There is no distinction between the Utah Probate 
Code and the Oklahoma Probate Code. In fact, the United States 
Supreme Court referred to the Utah statute as a comparative 
statute. Id. at 1347. Consequently, the guaranties of due process 
also apply in the application of the claim bar period as it relates 
to Charter's claim against the estate of Glenn Claughton Anderson. 
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The same considerations of due process are also considerations 
under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7. While there are 
very few Utah cases construing the due process requirements under 
the Utah Constitution, it is clear that the considerations of due 
process under the Utah Constitution are the same as those under the 
United States Constitution. See, Vali Convalescent & Care Inst. 
vs. Ind. Com'n of Utah, 649 P.2d 33 (Utah 1982); and Untermyer vs. 
State Tax Commission, 129 P.2d 881 (Utah 1942). As under the 
United States Constitution, the Utah Constitution guaranties due 
process by providing the opportunity to be heard when a property 
right may be affected. See, Wells vs. Children's AID Society of 
Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984). Therefore, the Constitutional 
considerations of due process set forth in Pope should also be 
applied by this Court under the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 7. 
B. Due Process Requires Actual Notice of the Event Which 
Will Adversely Affect a Property Right 
As set forth above, the District Court found that due process 
had been satisfied because Charter Thrift & Loan had actual notice 
of the death, the existence of the probate and the appointment of 
the personal representative. However, it is Charter's position 
that this is an erroneous conclusion of law and is therefore a 
manifest error which should be reversed. Due process under the 
United States Constitution, Amend. XIV, and the Utah Constitution, 
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requires that actual notice of the running of the non-claim bar 
period be provided. Notice of other facts related to the probate 
proceeding are not sufficient to insure due process in the barring 
of claims. 
In Pope, the Supreme Court held that known or reasonably 
ascertainable creditors must have actual "notice by mail or other 
means as certain to insure actual notice." Id. at 1348. By so 
ruling, the Supreme Court clearly was requiring actual notice of 
the event which would cut-off or "adversely affect" the property 
right. Id. In this instance, the event was the running of the 
claim bar period. In so ruling, the Supreme Court found that 
notice which was only published in accordance with the applicable 
statute was insufficient to bar the claims of creditors which were 
reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative because 
publication was not reasonably calculated to provide notice. Id. 
at 1347. 
In summary, the Supreme Court stated: 
We hold that Oklahoma's nonclaim statute is not a self-
executing statute of limitations. Rather, the statute 
operates in connection with Oklahoma's probate 
proceedings to "adversely affect" appellant's property 
interest. Thus, if appellant's identity as a creditor 
was known or "reasonably ascertainable", then the Due 
Process Clause requires that the appellant be given 
"notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure 
actual notice". (citation omitted). 
Id. at 1348. 
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Based upon the Pope decision, it is apparent that the prior 
Utah statute, under which the Appellee operated, requiring only 
published notice, is violative of due process and cannot suffice to 
activate the three (3) month time bar. Petitioner was a known 
creditor of the estate. Consequently, Petitioner was entitled to 
actual written notice, by mail or other comparable means, of the 
commencement of the three (3) month period for presentation of 
claims before its claim could be barred. As no such notice was 
given, Petitioner's claim should not have been barred. Therefore, 
the District Court erred and its ruling should be reversed and 
remanded with directions to allow the claim. 
TT, THE NOTICE TO WHICH PETITIONER IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
ENTITLED IS NOTICE OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE 
THREE (3) MONTH CLAIM PERIOD OF THE NONCLAIM STATUTE 
The United States Supreme Court in the Pope case ruled that a 
non-self-executing nonclaim statute, which does not require actual 
notice to known creditors, is unconstitutional as violative of due 
process. The rationale is that it is violative of due process to 
deprive a party of a property right through State action without 
actual notice. The Supreme Court was solely considering the effect 
of a published notice to present claims. Logic dictates that the 
actual notice which a party must receive, as a result of the 
decision in the Pope case, is notice to present claims or be 
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barred, which notice will trigger the nonclaim statute, thereby 
depriving a creditor of its property. 
A. The District Court Erred in Ruling that Notice of 
Death and Commencement of Probate was Constitutionally 
Sufficient Under the Due Process Clause 
The lower court erred in its conclusion of law that notice of 
death and of the commencement of probate through the appointment of 
a personal representative satisfies the due process requirements. 
Notice of a decedent's death is irrelevant. Upon an individual's 
death, a probate proceeding may never be started, no personal 
representative appointed and therefore the nonclaim statute would 
never be triggered. Similarly, the appointment of a personal 
representative does not trigger the nonclaim statute. Though a 
personal representative is appointed, the personal representative 
may never take the steps necessary to trigger the nonclaim statute. 
Consequently, the petitioner's knowledge of the appointment of a 
personal representative is irrelevant. 
The fact of which a known creditor must have notice is the 
commencement of the extremely brief three (3) month statutory 
period within which claims must be filed or barred. Actual notice 
to present claims is the only event which can constitutionally 
trigger the nonclaim statute and thereby satisfy due process 
concerns. Careful examination of the Pope case in conjunction with 
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the Oklahoma statute which was under scrutiny, supports this 
fundamentally logical position. 
The statutes which were under review were Oklahoma statutes, 
Title 58, §331-333, 1981. The Supreme Court ruled that the notice 
required by §331 was constitutionally insufficient on due process 
grounds because it did not provide for actual notice to known 
creditors. The Oklahoma statute required only that notice of the 
claim bar period to be published in some newspaper printed in the 
county. 
Consequently, the actual notice to which the Supreme Court was 
referring was notice of the commencement of the claim period. This 
is further supported by the simple logic resulting from the fact 
that the petitioner in the Pope case admittedly had knowledge of 
the decedent's death. 
In Pope, the Supreme Court ignored the fact that the creditor 
had actual notice of the death. The petitioner was a creditor with 
actual knowledge of the fact that the deceased had passed away. In 
fact, the creditor was the assignee and a subsidiary of the 
hospital where the deceased had passed away and was presenting a 
claim for the hospital's expenses of the deceased's final illness. 
Id. at 1344. It was in the context ol «i known creditor which had 
actual knowledge of the death of the decedent, that the Court found 
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that the creditor was still entitled to actual notice of the 
running of the claim bar period. 
Finally, the petitioner in the Pope case filed its claim a 
full four (4) years after the published notice to creditors. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the nonclaim statute and 
the published notice provided for therein was unconstitutional as 
it was not sufficient to protect the due process rights of 
creditors. Therefore, the petitioner's claim could not be 
constitutionally barred through application of the defective 
statute, even though a substantial period of time had expired since 
the creditor became aware of the death and even though it effected 
the administration of the estate. 
Immediately after the United States Supreme Court handed down 
the Pope ruling, the 1989 session of the Utah Legislature amended 
§75-3-801 to add the following sentence: 
The personal representative shall, after making 
reasonable efforts to ascertain creditors of the estate, 
also mail such notice on or before fourteen (14) days 
after the date of first publication to all then known 
creditors of the estate. 
It is apparent from the text of the Pope opinion, as well as 
from the actions of the Utah Legislature that the prior Utah 
statute, requiring only published notice, is violative of due 
process and cannot suffice to bar known creditor's claims. It is 
a rule of statutory construction that the legislature is presumed 
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to be aware of judicial rulings effecting statutes. Lvnes vs. 
Yakima Public School No, 7., 533 F 140 (Wash. App. 1975). 
Presumably, the Utah State legislature recognized the 
unconstitutionality of the prior statute and amended it with the 
intent to make the notice requirement conform to the requirements 
of the Pope ruling. 
Petitioner was a known creditor of the estate and was 
therefore entitled to actual notice by mail, or other means equally 
certain to ensure actual notice, of the commencement of the three 
(3) month period for presentation of claims. No such notice was 
given and Charter's claims should not have been barred. 
Consequently, the lower Court erred in barring Charter's claims, 
which decision should be reversed. 
B. Inquiry Notice is Not Sufficient 
It appears that the implication of the District Court's ruling 
is that a creditor with knowledge of the death and of the 
appointment of the personal representative should make further 
inquiries as to whether the claim bar period is running. However, 
inquiry notice is not sufficient to meet the requirements of due 
process. This is supported by the simple language of the Pope 
decision which required "actual notice11 It is further supported 
by other recent decisions in analogous situations where property 
rights were being extinguished by state action. 
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In the case of City of New York vs. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.. 
73 S.Ct. 299 (1953), a railroad was being reorganized pursuant to 
the Bankruptcy Act. Pursuant to that proceeding, certain liens 
which the City of New York had on property owned by the railroad 
were extinguished and action thereon was barred by the City's 
failure to present its claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 
3 00. However, the City of New York received no copy of the Bar 
Order and had to rely for notice on publication in the Wall Street 
Journal. JEd. The City of New York had actual knowledge that the 
proceedings had been commenced. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that 
the city was still entitled to actual notice that its claims were 
going to be barred. 
Nor can the bar order against New York be sustained 
because of the city's knowledge that reorganization of 
the railroad was taking place in the court. The argument 
is that such knowledge puts a duty on creditors to 
inquire for themselves about possible Court orders 
limiting the time for filing claims. But even creditors 
who have knowledge of a reorganization have a right to 
assume that the statutory "reasonable notice11 will be 
given them before their claims are forever barred. 
Id. at 301. Thus, inquiry notice was not sufficient to justify 
extinguishment of a property right by Court action. 
A comparable result was reached by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Reliable Elec. Co., Inc. vs. Olson 
Const. Co., 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984). In the Reliable case, 
the issue was once again the barring of a claim against a 
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bankruptcy estate, in the absence of notice. In Reliable, the 
creditor was informed of the initiation of the Chapter 11 
proceedings. Id. at 621. This is comparable to the present matter 
in which the petitioner had notice of the death of the decedent, as 
well as the appointment of a personal representative. However, the 
bankruptcy estate failed to give the creditor in Reliable notice of 
the confirmation hearing. Under the circumstances, the Court ruled 
that the due process rights of the creditor had been violated. "In 
as much as Olson was deprived of the opportunity to comment on 
Reliable's Third Amended Plan of Reorganization, it was denied due 
process of law." Id. at 622. 
The Reliable case is analogous to the present matter in yet 
another way. In Reliable, the bankruptcy estate had given the 
statutorily required notice. The Court went on to rule that 
compliance with statutory requirements is not sufficient if the 
statute does not satisfy due process requirements. 
However, we hold that notwithstanding the language of 
Section 1141, the discharge of a claim without reasonable 
notice of the confirmation hearing is violative of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Id. at 623. 
The same result was reached in In Re Herd, 840 F.2d 757 (10th 
Cir. 1988) . In this bankruptcy case the creditor received an 
obviously erroneous notice w 1 Ii c 1 :i 11 Ie lower court determined put 
them on notice to inquire concerning further matters, id. at 758. 
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The Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit ruled that: 
Inquiry notice of the bar date, in this situation, is not 
enough: ...actual knowledge of the filing of a bankruptcy 
does not negate the statutory notice requirements nor 
does it place a duty on creditors to inquire regarding 
the time limitations for filing claims. ...Written 
notice of the bar date for filing claims should be clear 
and definite, not abstract and ambiguous. 
Id. at 759, 760. 
The same result was obtained in the context of a tax sale of 
real property. In Walker vs. City of Hutchinson, 77 S.Ct. 200 
(1956), the interest of a property owner in his property was being 
effected by condemnation proceedings. The statute in question 
permitted notice to be given either "in writing. . . or by one 
publication in the official city paper...11 Id. at 201. Though the 
city gave published notice, so as to satisfy the statute, the 
Supreme Court ruled that this was violative of due process. The 
Supreme Court so ruled in reliance on the case of Mullane vs. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.. 70 S.Ct. 652 (1950). 
Measured by the principles stated in the Mullane case, we 
think that the notice by publication here falls short of 
the requirements of due process. It is common knowledge 
that mere newspaper publication rarely informs the land 
owner of proceedings against his property. In Mullane we 
pointed out many of the infirmities of such notice and 
emphasized the advantage of some kind of personal notice 
to interested parties. In the present case there seems 
to be no compelling or even persuasive reasons why such 
direct notice cannot be given. Appellant's name was 
known to the city and was on the official records. Even 
a letter would have appraised him that his property was 
about to be taken and that he must appear if he wanted to 
be heard as to its value. 
Id. at 202. 
Like the landowner in Walker, Charter's identity was known to 
the personal representative and actual written notice of the 
running of the claim bar period could have been given. 
Finally, in Mennonite BD. of Missions vs. Adams, 103 S.Ct. 
2706 (1983), the same result was reached on Fourteenth Amendment 
due process grounds, in the context of a tax sale. In the 
Mennonite decision, all required statutory notices were given. 
These included posted and published notice. Jd. at 2708. Further, 
this included actual mailed notice to the property owner of record. 
However, the mortgagee, the appellant in Mennonite, received no 
notice other than the published and posted notice. Under these 
circumstances, the Court ruled that: 
When the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is 
publicly recorded, constructive notice by publication 
must be supplemented by notice mailed to the mortgagee's 
last-known available address or by personal service. 
Id. at 2711. 
The Court went on to state that knowledge of a delinquency in 
the payment of taxes, which could be described as inquiry notice, 
was not sufficient. Id. at 2712. Again, the Supreme Court in 
Mennonite so ruled on the basis of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in reliance on Mullane. 
CONCLUSION 
It is beyond realistic dispute that the Pope decision requires 
that, in order to comply with constitutional guaranties of due 
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process, a known creditor in a probate proceeding is entitled to 
receive actual notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure 
actual notice of the running of the claim bar period. It is 
undisputed that the only notice provided by the personal 
representative in this matter was by publication. It is also 
undisputed that Charter Thrift & Loan was a known creditor. The 
lower court erred in concluding that Charter's knowledge of the 
Decedent's death and appointment of a Personal Representative was 
constitutionally sufficient to bar Charter's claims. The fact that 
Charter may have had knowledge sufficient to allow it to make 
inquiry wasn't a proper basis upon which to find that due process 
was satisfied. Charter Thrift & Loan was constitutionally entitled 
to actual notice by mail or other reasonable means of commencement 
of the three (3) month period within which to file claims before 
its claim could be barred. 
Therefore, Charter Thrift & Loan respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse the Judgment of the District Court and rule that 
Charter Thrift & Loan was entitled to receive actual notice to 
present its claims, and since such notice did not take place, its 
claim has not been barred. Further, this Court should remand this 
matter to the lower court directing that Charter's claim against 
the estate be allowed, plus awarding its attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in presenting this appeal, as allowed by the attorney's 
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fees provision of Charter's contract with the deceased. Rule 34, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Dixon vs. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 
879, 881 (Utah 1988). 
DATED this H day of April, 1991. 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
M#rk/S. Swan 
Attorney for Charter Thrift 
& Loan 
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Shelly J. Jones, Personal Representative 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
S. Dee Long 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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Copper State Thrift & Loan 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH f 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
GLENS CLAUGHTON ANDERSON, : 
JR. , 
: Probate No. P-87-816 
Deceased* Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The Petition of Allowance of Claim of Charter Thrift & Loan 
against the estate of the above-named Decedent, and the Personal 
Representative's denial of that claim came on for hearing on the 
25th day of July, 1990, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. 
Creditor Charter Thrift & Loan appeared through their counsel, Mark 
S. Swan of the law firm RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C, and the 
Personal Representative appeared through her counsel, S. Dee Long. 
The Court having considered the memoranda and affidavits submitted 
by the various parties, and being fully advised herein, now makes 
its: 
RUED MSTMCT HURT 
Third Judicial District 
S E P - 4 B9Q 
bALtLAKfcGOJfilY 
DmjtvCtortt 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 The Decedent, Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr., died on the 
19th day of July, 1987 and was a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, 
2. A pi obate was filed In the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State; of Utah on the 12th day of August, 1987, 
for the probate of Decedent's Will. 
3. Decedent's daughter , Shelly J, Jor ies, was appointed 
Personal Representative of said estate. 
4. Said Personal Representative caused a notice to creditors 
to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in accordance with 
Utah Code Annotated. §75-3-801. 
5. Said Persoi ia] Representative, Shelly J". Jones, personally 
contacted Charter Thrift & Loan by telephone and informed him of 
her father's death, and that a probate had been filed, and that she 
had been appointed Personal Representat I ve of her fat* iei ' s estate. 
6. Charter Thrift & Loan did not have actual notice of the 
publication of the Notice to creditors to submit claims nor actual 
notice of the running of the claim bar per iod. 
7. Charter Thrift & Loan did not file a creditor's claim 
within the three (3) months of publication as required by U.C.A., 
§75-3-801, and did not file a creditor's claim until March l, 1990. 
From the forgoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
ii iter s i t s : ' • . 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of both the parties and the 
subject matter. 
2. The Personal Representative of the estate met all 
requirements of the Utah Uniform Probate Code in giving notice to 
creditors, 
3. The constitutional due process rights of the creditor, 
Charter Thrift & Loan, were not violated because said creditor had 
received actual notice of the Decedent1s death, the filing of the 
probate, and the appointment of Shelly J- Jones as Personal 
Representative, 
4. The creditor's claim of Charter Thrift & Loan was not 
made within the statutory three month time period of the date of 
first publication of notice to creditors as required by law, and 
is thus forever barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent. 
DATED this *f day of M ^ e t f 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
prf A ^ K V ^ ^ T T 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
S. Dee Long (S y J 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the _ _ day of August 2 990, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
Ma :i 1 s, postage prepa id, addressed as fol 1 ows: 
Shelley J. Jones, Personal Repr esentat i ve 
2939 Brookburn Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
S. Dee Long 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
ch730700.c90 
Mark S. Swan - 3873 ™ro Judicial Dfrtrict 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN t OVERHOLT, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
311 South State, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)539-8632 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f 
Copper S t a t e T h r i f t & Loan 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
) L 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF, : ORDER 
GLENS CLAUGHTON ANDERSON, : 
JR. , 
: Probate No, P-87-816 
Deceased• Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The hearing on the Petition of Charter Thrift & Loan for 
Allowance of Claims, and the denial of said claim by the Personal 
Representative of the estate, came on for hearing on the 25th day 
of July, 1990, before the Honorable Hcmer F. Wilkinson. Charter 
Thrift & Loan appeared by and through its counsel, Mark S. Swan of 
the law firm RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. The Personal 
Representative of the estate appeared through her counsel and 
counsel for the estate, S. Dee Long. The Court having considered 
all documents on file herein, having reviewed the memoranda and 
affidavits submitted by the parties, having heard argument of 
counsel, having heretofore signed and filed its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law# and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the creditor's claim of 
Charter Thrift & Loan against the above-named Decedent's estate is 
hereby disallowed and forever barred against the estate, the 
Personal Representative and the heirs and devisees of the decedent. 
DATED this (J- day of te*£t, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
•3 / A/M /T&-
. Dfee Long (/ ^ 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 1990, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
Mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Shelley J, Jones, Personal Representative 
2939 Brookburn Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
S. Dee Long 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
Ch730700.c90 
